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provision in the federal CAN-SPAM Act. The scope of express preemption under the
federal CAN-SPAM Act, however, has been the subject of several court decisions
that have preserved claims under various state statutes. These cases raise questions
about the efficacy and propriety of preemption under CAN-SPAM.
This article explains express preemption and the policy behind its use by
Congress in the federal CAN-SPAM statute. The article examines the state claims
that have survived in the face of that express preemption to determine if the current
federal/state dynamic accomplishes the public policy CAN-SPAM intended to
address. The article concludes with recommendations to revise CAN-SPAM to
reinstate state protections or to include the best aspects of the preempted state laws in
the federal law.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHEN DOES PREEMPTION NOT REALLY PREEMPT?
THE ROLE OF STATE LAW AFTER CAN-SPAM
The Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution enables
Congress to protect the national economic interests of the United
States.' States may regulate interstate business when commercial
activity threatens the health or welfare of local citizens.2 However,
according to the Dormant or Negative Commerce Clause, 3 state
regulations cannot impose an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.
4
In the borderless cyber-economy, Congress recently circumvented
the debate over the alleged undue burdens that arise from multi-state
compliance. Congress resorted to express preemption regarding
internet service taxes5 and is considering this approach regarding
spyware regulation.6 Congress also expressly preempted most state
regulations of unsolicited commercial email, commonly known as
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power "to... regulate Commerce... among
the several States").
2 See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (A local smoke
ordinance against vessels was upheld).
3 See generally Wikipedia, Dormant Commerce Clause, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
DormantCommerceClause (last visited Jan. 23, 2008). According to Justice Felix
Frankfurter, "the Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws
for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force
created an area of trade free from interference by the States. In short, the Commerce Clause
even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the
States." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
4 "[I]n the name of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Court has significantly limited the
power of states to regulate across a wide range of subject areas, including train and truck
safety, imports and exports of myriad goods and services, the conditions for the intake and
outflow of solid and liquid waste, and insurance and corporatel [sic] law." Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IowA L. REv. 243,263 (2005).
' 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
6 Currently there are two federal spyware bills pending in Congress. The SPY ACT would
preempt all state spyware laws except "trespass, contract, or tort law" or "other State laws to
the extent that those laws relate to acts of fraud." H.R. 29, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005). The SPY
BLOCK Act would preempt all state spyware law except "State criminal, trespass, contract,
tort, or anti-fraud law." S. 687, 109th Cong. § 10 (2005). See also Jordan M. Blanke, Robust
Notice and "Informed Consent:" The Keys to Successful Spyware Legislation, 7 COLUM. Sd.
& TECH. L. REv. 2 (2006).
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spam.7 As of 2004, more than thirty states had passed various anti-
span regulations that were affected by the preemption provision in the
federal CAN-SPAM Act.8  The scope of express preemption under
CAN-SPAM, however, has been the subject of several court decisions
preserving claims under various state statutes. These cases raise
questions about the efficacy and propriety of preemption under CAN-
SPAM.
First, this article briefly summarizes the problems associated with
unwanted commercial email and the regulatory approaches to
alleviating these problems. 9  Then, the article explains express
preemption and the policy behind its use by Congress in the federalCAN-SPAM statute. °  Next, the article examines state claims that
have survived in the face of that express preemption to determine if the
current federal/state dynamic actually accomplishes the public policyCAN-SPAM intended to address." The article concludes with a
recommendation to revise CAN-SPAM to reinstate state protections or
to include the best aspects from the preempted state laws in the federal
law.12
7 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-87, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-13; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001,
1037; 28 U.S.C. § 994; and 47 U.S.C. § 227). The law is known by its acronym CAN-SPAM.
Despite the reference to pornography in the title, the Act applies to all commercial email
messaging.
8 Jonathan Bick, Congress Has Come to Control Spam, Not to Bury It, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 16,2004. By their own provisions, the anti-spain statutes of Minnesota, Missouri and Tennessee
automatically terminated upon the passage of CAN-SPAM. MINN. STAT. § 325F. 694 (2007);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.1132.3 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501 (2006). North Dakota's
law states that any provision of federal law dealing with false or misleading emails will
supersede the North Dakota law. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-27-09 (2007).
9 See infra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
10 See infa notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 62-103 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF UNWANTED COMMERCIAL EMAIL
Legal, technical and news media have repeatedly documented the
problem of unwanted commercial email. 13 This section will explain
the major concerns that are relevant to the analysis below and will
provide the most recent estimates of the costs of spam.
The term "spam" actually encompasses a variety of unwanted
commercial emails, each with their own associated problems. First,
email can be a delivery system for viruses, worms, and data mining
programs, all of which may trigger extraordinary harms to computer
systems or individual computers and lead to identity theft.14 Most of
the regulatory relief discussed below is not intended to combat the
criminal intentions behind these messages. That said, however, the
civil regulatory mechanisms discussed below can lighten the burden of
non-criminal spam, thus freeing up attention and public resources to
combat emails that facilitate computer crimes.
Email is also the latest tool for con artists. Just like snake oil
salesmen of the past, con artists now use email to perpetuate age-old
frauds to get money from the unwitting in exchange for unfulfilled
promises of riches, exotic travel, prize money, virility, and more.15
Further, messages peddling get-rich-quick schemes and fake charities,
as well as those offering legitimate commercial products, often use
false subject headings or transmission paths to avoid spam-blocking
filters. In the discussion below, all of these messages are characterized
as misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent. They are the express target of
most spam enforcement today.
Finally, truthful commercial email delivers a legitimate
commercial message and makes no attempt to hide its commercial
purpose. These emails are the latest form of interactive marketing,
13 For example, a Lexis search of"spam /s costs" in the Combined Law Review, CLE, Legal
Journals and Periodicals fields yielded 34 articles from the previous year. The same search in
the English-Language News file returned 552 articles.
14 See, e.g., Miering de Villiers, Free Radicals in Cyberspace: Complex Liability Issues in
Computer Warfare, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 13, 20 (2005) (explaining that email
attachments accounted for 88% of virus attacks in 2003, up from only nine percent in 1996
when most viruses were transmitted by infected diskettes); see also Dana L. Bazelon, Yun
Jung Choi & Jason F. Conaty, Computer Crimes, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 259, 260-63 (2006).
15 See generally Aaron Larson, Spain Email Fraud, EXPERTLAW, June 2004, available at
http://www.expertlaw.com/library/consumer/spamuemailfraud.html; see also FTC Names Its
Dirty Dozen: 12 Scams Most Likely to Arrive Via Bulk Email, FTC CONSUMER ALERT, July
1998, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/07/dozen.shtm.
[Vol. 3:3
2007-08]
following in the tradition of door-to-door salesmen, bulk mail,
telemarketing, and junk faxes. These email messages enjoy
commercial speech protection under the First Amendment."
Nevertheless, they are subject to regulation because of the significant
burdens associated with them.17
The burdens associated with spain can be divided into two
categories: harms to Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") and their
systems and harms to individual recipients. According to The Radicati
Group, a technology and market research firm, roughly 183 billion
spain messages were sent each day in 2006;18 of those, 59 percent
successfully landed in inboxes. 9 To maintain that less-than-sparkling
41 percent filtering rate, Sara Radicati estimates that $198 billion will
be spent in 2007, up 10 times from the $20.5 billion her company
estimated was spent combating spain in 2003 .20 That cost covers anti-
spam filters, extra server space and network infrastructure, and
information technology customer-service hours.2 1
The harm to individual users is harder to quantify but is just as
real. When Congress adopted CAN-SPAM, it set out some of these
concerns in its findings. Unwanted email costs recipients for the
storage and time they spend accessing, reviewing, and discarding
unwanted messages. 22 Large numbers of unwanted messages increase
the risk that valuable messages will be lost or overlooked while the
23user attempts to manage all the messages. As a result, the reliability
and usefulness of email as a communications tool is reduced for the
16 White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366, 374-78 (5th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 1039 (2006).
17 See infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
18 Catherine Holahan, Rising Stakes in the Spam Wars; Anti-spammers are Losing the Battle
Against Unsolicited and Often Harmful E-mail, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 19, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.con/technology/content/sep2006/tc2006o 9l 9 41l2904.htm.
'
9
1d.
20 id.
21 id
22 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3) (2004).
23 § 7701(a)(4).
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24
recipient. Additionally, "some commercial electronic mail contains
material that many recipients may consider vulgar or pornographic." 25
Finally, spam alters a long-held market expectation that the
advertiser will directly bear the costs of advertising, while the market
will only indirectly bear those costs through higher prices. In contrast
the recipient bears most of the direct costs of spain advertising. 2 6
Economists opine that advertising serves a "signaling function" to
consumers that the advertised product is of a certain guality based on
the expense the firm committed to advertising it.27  Accordingly,
consumers make judgments about the appropriate price of an item of
that quality. 28 If the consumer, not the firm, is incurring most of the
direct advertising expense, basic economic expectations about price
and quality are upended.
When enacting CAN-SPAM, Congress found that email's "low
cost and global reach make it extremely convenient and efficient, and
offer unique opportunities for the development and growth of
frictionless commerce., 29 Congress also found that the value of email
is "threatened by the extremely rapid growth in the volume of
unsolicited commercial electronic mail."3 - Obviously, the costs that
spam to ISPs and individual recipients justify government regulation
that attempts to limit these harms. The next question is whether
federal or state law, or both, can best address these harms.
III. THE CAN-SPAM ACT VERSUS STATE LAW PROTECTIONS
The express preemption provisions in CAN-SPAM intend to create
a single regulatory treatment of unsolicited commercial email.
24id.
25 § 7701(a)(5).
26 See generally Daniel B. Kennedy, Netiquette: Mind Your Manners or Get Burned, CIiH.
DAiLY L. BULL., at 6, Feb. 20, 1996.
27 See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974).
28 See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,
94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986).
29 § 7701(a)(1).
30 § 7701(a)(2).
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Many States have enacted legislation intended to regulate or
reduce unsolicited commercial electronic mail, but these
statutes impose different standards and requirements. As a
result, they do not appear to have been successful in
addressing the problems associated with unsolicited
commercial electronic mail, in part because, since an
electronic mail address does not specify a geographic
location it can be extremely difficult to know with which of
these disparate statutes they are required to comply.3'
Whether preemption in CAN-SPAM has actually yielded a single,
meaningful national standard for anti-spain regulation is questionable,
because Congress did not entirely occupy the field of anti-spam
regulation. The parameters of the federal versus state regulations are
discussed next.
The federal CAN-SPAM Act does not prohibit sending unsolicited
commercial emails. It focuses on disclosure and opting-out
mechanisms. First, email solicitations or advertisements for products
and services must be identified by means that are "clear and
conspicuous." 32 In addition, commercial email senders are prohibited
from using misleading or bogus subject lines and retransmissions of
email ads for the purpose of concealing their origins.
33
The CAN-SPAM Act expressly preempts state anti-span laws with
stricter provisions.34 Most of the state anti-spam laws also prohibit
false or misleading subject lines and origins. 5 A maiority of
preempted state laws, however, added a technical mandate6: they
dictated that unsolicited commercial email must include a heading of
"ADV" or "ADV ADULT" (for sexually explicit content) in the
31 § 7701(a)(11).
32 Unlike many now-preempted state laws, however, no uniform label, such as ADV, is
required. Without such a uniform tag, blocking software is less effective at screening for these
messages and consumers will have to delete them individually. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(5) (2004).
33 § 7704(a)(1)-(2).
34 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b) (2004).
35 Lily Zhang, The CAN-SPAMAct: An Insufficient Response to the Growing Spain Problem,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 301,315-17 (2005).
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subject line.37 The advantage of such provisions is that spam filtering
programs could more easily search for these common appellations to
dispatch incoming messages to a junk mail folder or block them from
the email server altogether.38  Nevertheless, these state technical
standards are preempted by CAN-SPAM. Instead, Congress opted for
a more generic mandate that solicitation emails be identified by means
that are "clear and conspicuous. 39
Unfortunately, junk mail filters cannot be programmed to spot
notices that are "clear and conspicuous" when the actual terms of the
notices vary from sender to sender.40  In other words, Congress
asserted that the different standards found in states laws were
ineffective at preventing spain. Yet Congress actually preempted these
ADV heading mandates that were fairly uniform among the state laws
and adopted a much looser "clear and conspicuous" standard that is
not technically operational. Preemption of these state mandates seems
to contradict the legislative intent behind CAN-SPAM to limit
unwanted commercial email.41
According to CAN-SPAM, commercial solicitation email must
give recipients the ability to send a reply message or other "Internet-
based communication" in order to opt-out of additional emails from
that sender. 42 This Internet-based mechanism for opting-out must
remain viable for at least 30 days after the original message was sent.
43
A majority of the states' anti-spain laws included mandates for
37 Id.
38 Roger Allen Ford, Preemption of State Spain Laws by the Federal CAN-SPAMAct, 72 U.
CHI. L. REv. 355, 364 (2005).
39 id.
40 Id.; see also Adam Hamel, Will the CAN-SPAMAct of 2003 Finally Put a Lid on
Unsolicited Email?, 39 NEw ENG. L. REv. 961,995 (2005).
41 "This battle in the spain war highlights the fundamental disagreement over the purpose and
goal of CAN-SPAM. If the goal of the Act is to reduce the volume of spam at all costs, then
the answer is clear: a uniform tag, like ADV, which can be used to filter out all unsolicited
commercial messages will go a long way toward achieving that goal. If, however, the goal is
not to eradicate spain completely, but rather to protect consumers from fraudulent e-mail
offers, 'clear and conspicuous,' though non-uniform, 'identification' will allow e-mail users to
quickly identify commercial messages without inhibiting the free flow of information over the
Internet or stymieing the development of e-commerce." Hamel, supra note 40, at 996.
42 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3)(A) (2004).
43 § 7704(a)(3)(A)(ii).
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allowing recipients to opt-out of future solicitations. 44 Of those states,
only New Mexico included standards that would be deemed stricter
than the federal CAN-SPAM mandates because New Mexico required
that the opt-out information be located at the beginning of the email
text.
45
After receiving an opt-out request, CAN-SPAM allows the sender
10 business days to cease further email solicitations to that recipient.46
The sender also is prohibited from selling or otherwise transferring
email addresses of persons who have opted-out of future mailings.
In addition to a legitimate return email address, the commercial email
solicitor must also provide its postal address. 48
Unfortunately, opt-out provisions in CAN-SPAM are inadequate.
Many computer security experts recommend that recipients not click
on opt-out links because that action tells spammers the email address
is active, thus signaling them to continue soliciting and to sell the
address to other spammers. As a result, the cure becomes worse than
the disease. 49  Accordingly, the opt-out regulation is completely
ineffective if it is not backed-up with meaningful remedies when opt-
out requests are routinely ignored.
Under CAN-SPAM, Congress empowered the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") to enforce the law with civil penalties.50
Congress also created a private cause of action for ISPs for violations
that adversely affect their ability to provide their service.51 In such
44 See generally Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.shtnil (last visited Jan.
23, 2008).
45 N.M. STAT. § 57-12-23(B)(2) (2006).
46 § 7704(a)(4)(A)(i).
47 § 7704(a)(4)(A)(iv).
41 § 7704(a)(5)(A)(iii).
41 "The opt out system, however, does not work because most spammers abuse the confidence
of consumers that click on 'opt out' links in commercial e-mail. Spammers know that these
consumers have read their e-mail, thus validating the consumers' address. Validated addresses
get even more spare." Peter B. Maggs, Abusive Advertising on the Internet (SPAM) under
United States Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 385, 391 (2006).
50 The FTC has pursued twenty civil actions under CAN-SPAM through 2005. See FTC,
EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, app. 5(2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/051 2 20canspamrpt.pdf.
"' 15 U.S.C. § 7 706 (g)(1) (2004). ISP actions from the inception of CAN-SPAM through 2005
total 27. FTC, supra note 50, app. 6.
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actions, courts may award injunctive relief, as well as actual or
statutory damages. The statutory damages range from $25 to $1
million 5per email. 52 Attorney's fees are also available under CAN-
SPAM. Despite its findings about harm to individual recipients of
spam,54 Congress created no comparable private cause of action under
CAN-SPAM for individual email recipients who are damaged by
unwanted email solicitation. As such, individuals and businesses
whose email access is burdened with spam have no recourse when
their opt-out requests are ignored. Spammers remain undeterred until
their violations reach a critical mass and trigger the FTC or an ISP to
take action.
Most of the state anti-spam laws that were preempted by CAN-
SPAM provided both ISPs and individual email recipients with private
statutory claims. These state laws provided statutory damages that
ranged from $10 per offending email message55 to $500.56 Some
states provided greater remedies for ISPs than for individuals. 57 All
states that provided private causes of action and statutory damages also
provided attorneys fees and costs for prevailing plaintiffs.
Presumably, these state law remedies made it financially feasible
for email users to actually pursue anti-spam actions. Accordingly,
these laws could have created an effective deterrent against spammers.
CAN-SPAM came along quickly after many of these state laws went
into effect. Therefore, there was never any meaningful opportunity to
see if these remedies actually could make a difference in combating
the spam problem before they were preempted by federal law.
52 § 7706(g)(3).
13 § 7706(g)(4).
14 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3)-(5) (2004).
55 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1372.02.B (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-
606(b)(1)(A) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2.5-104(2)(b) (2007). Illinois provides the lesser
of $10 per email or $25,000 per day. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 511 /10-(c) (2007).
56 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570c(d) (2007); FLA. STAT. § 668.606(3)(b) (2007); IND.
CODE § 24-5-22-10(d)(2) (2007). California provides a remedy of $1000 per email. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2007). Idaho provides the greater of $100 per
email or $1000. IDAHO CODE § 48-603E(4) (2007).
57 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 714E.l(3)(a) & (b) (2007); ME. REv. STAT. § 1497.7 & 8 (2007);
MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 14-3003 (2007).
58 See generally Spain Laws, supra note 44.
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Historically, harms to individuals for loss or diminished use and
enjoyment of their property have been protected by classic property-
right torts under state law, such as trespass and nuisance.59 These tort
claims, however, require proof of actual damages. In the case of harm
from unwanted email, the cost of storing, accessing, reviewing,
discarding, and filtering messages can be extremely difficult to
quantify even for ISPs on their systems, but especially for individual
businesses and consumers. Further, traditional tort actions to protect
property rights require plaintiffs to pay their own attorneys' fees.
Attorneys have little incentive to take such cases on contingent fee
arrangements when claims for actual damages are low and punitive
damages are difficult to prove. Fronting the costs of any such
litigation could be prohibitive for many individuals. Despite the
inadequacy of these tort claims in providing meaningful consumer
relief or any corresponding deterrent effect on spammers, Congress
preserved "State laws that are not specific to electronic mail, including
State trespass, contract, or tort law. ' 60
Under CAN-SPAM, Congress expressly permits states to retain the
power to regulate deceptive email advertising.6' This is a traditional
role of state law to protect citizens from fraud. This construct of
leaving some state law protection intact while preempting other
aspects of state authority under CAN-SPAM, however, may actually
frustrate one stated goal of the federal law: to create a uniform
standard for spam regulation. Email advertisers are still subject to
state-by-state enforcement, so the goal of a uniform system for
nationwide compliance has failed. At the same time, meaningful
consumer relief provided by state statutory claims is frustrated by
preemption. The resulting mix of federal and state law makes little
sense from the perspective of either promoting national economic
interests or protecting consumers.
Several state law claims have survived under court interpretations
of the deceptive advertising provisions in CAN-SPAM. These
decisions are discussed next.
59Regarding the use of tort law to tackle the problem of span or other cyber harms, see
Steven Kam, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427 (2004); see also Jeremiah Kelman, E-Nuisance: Unsolicited Bulk
Email at the Boundaries of Common Law Property Rights, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 363 (2004).
61 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2)(A) (2004).
61 § 7707(b)(1).
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IV. STATE FRAUD CLAIMS SURVIVE PREEMPTION
CHALLENGES UNDER CAN-SPAM
62
Congress found that most unsolicited commercial email messages
"are fraudulent or deceptive in one or more respects." 63  As noted
above, CAN-SPAM and most state anti-spam laws prohibit emails
with false or misleading subject lines, transmission paths, or email
origins.64 When recipients sue under these state laws, defendants have
been unsuccessful in defeating the claims based on preemption under
CAN-SPAM because the claims are based on the authority retained by
the states to protect against deceptive advertising.
For example, in Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., a
Maryland ISP sued under the Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail
Act. 5 Beyond Systems, Inc. ("BSI") claimed it had received 6202
unsolicited commercial email messages from the defendants that were
false or misleading regarding their origin or transmission path, or that
contained false or misleading information in the subject line.66 The
Maryland statute authorizes Maryland recipients of commercial email
to sue senders of messages that contain false or misleading information
in the subject line or about the origin or transmission path of the
62 In White Buffalo Ventures, the 5th Circuit held that an action by a state agency acting in its
role as ISP was not preempted. This outcome is limited to cases when a state is acting as an
email service provider and would have no applicability to claims by recipients suing under
state anti-spain laws.
63 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2) (2004).
64 § 7701(a)(1)-(2).
65 Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (D. Md. 2006).
66 An earlier case brought under the Maryland statute dealt only with the issues of personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state spanmer, as well as a claim that the statute violated the
negative commerce power. Mary CLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818,
824-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006). The Maryland court, as well as other courts have found
the exercise ofjurisdiction by a plaintiff's state to be proper based on spam contacts with the
state. See, e.g., Verizon Online Serv., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002);
see also State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001); but see Rhodes v. Unisys Corp., 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 6143 (11 th Cir. 2006) (holding that a single email from a CEO did not
constitute sufficient contacts by him with the state to justify personal jurisdiction); Rice v.
Karsch, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 24709 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that personal jurisdiction over
an attorney was improper since his email communications in the state were only in response to
messages initiated by the plaintiff); Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC,
878 A.2d 567 (Md. App. 2004) (plaintiff was unable to establish an agency relationship to
connect the defendant to the spammers).
message.67 Under the Maryland law, an ISP may recover $1000 per
email or actual damages (versus $25 per email under CAN-SPAM).
68
The Beyond Systems, Inc. Court rejected the defendants' assertion that
the state claim was preempted under CAN-SPAM. CAN-SPAM
"provides a carve-out" for state laws like the Maryland statute that
target emails that are false or deceptive in any portion.69  The
Maryland statute is not impliedly inconsistent with CAN-SPAM
either, according to the Court, because it furthers all of the goals of the
federal law.
70
Similarly, in Gordon v. Impulse Marketing Group, Inc., a
Washington resident sued a Nevada company under the Washington
Commercial Electronic Mail Act71 and the Washington Consumer
Protection Act72 for conspiring to initiate email transmissions with
false or misleading information in the subject line.73 The Gordon
Court held that CAN-SPAM does not preempt state spam laws that
regulate falsity or deception in commercial email messages.
7 4
In this case, the plaintiff was a small business owner with an
Internet website, not an ISP. Washington's statutory damages provide
email users a remedy of $500 per offending email. No such claim is
available to individual recipients like Gordon under CAN-SPAM.
The Washington district court did not consider if a private cause of
action by an individual recipient would be impliedly preempted by the
federal law that does not provide such a claim. Congress, however,
would have been fully aware that such private claims existed in the
state laws when it crafted the preemption provisions that preserved
those state law claims against deceptive or misleading messages. The
implied preemption analysis of the Beyond Systems, Inc. Court (in
dicta, since that case dealt with the claim of an ISP) supports the
67 MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 14-3002(b) (West 2007).
68 Id. at § 14-3003. End users who receive such messages can recover $500 per email under
the Maryland law, but have no claims under CAN-SPAM.
69 Beyond Sys., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
701 Id. at 538.
7l WASH. REv. CODE § 19.190.020(1) (2007).
72 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86 (2007).
73 Gordon v. Impulse Mktg. Group, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2005).
74 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1)).
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outcome for James Gordon: "providing a civil remedy to the individual'
recipient ...is fully in harmony with CAN-SPAM's enforcement
mechanisms.
75
In Asis Internet Services. v. Optin Global, Inc.,76 defendants did
not assert that the anti-spam claim under the California Business and
Professions Code was preempted by CAN-SPAM. Instead, they
asserted that both the CAN-SPAM claim and the state cause of action
were fraud claims that must be pled with particularity under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).77 (Defendants in Gordon unsuccessfully
pursued the same defense when their preemption arguments failed.7 ")
The Asis Court, citing Gordon, disagreed that the California statute (as
well as CAN-SPAM) reflected classic elements of fraud.79 The Court
found that CAN-SPAM and the California Code prohibit false or
misleading subject lines or originating email addresses. 80  The Asis
Court concluded that these prohibitions lacked several of the elements
of a traditional common law fraud claim: knowledge of the falsity,
materiality, intent to defraud, or reliance on the falsity.81
These conclusions reveal the importance of state statutory claims
to spam recipients. Although CAN-SPAM preserved state tort claims
such as fraud,82 the statutory anti-spain claims are much easier to
prove than a traditional fraud claim. Again, the statutory claims
provide damages and attorney's fees that make the claims financially
feasible, whereas claims for actual fraud damages may not be.
Although the cases above reveal that a plaintiff need not prove a
defendant's actual knowledge of the falsity in a message, many state
75 BeyondSys., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
76 Asis Internet Servs. v. Optin Global, Inc., 2006 WL 1820902 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
78 Gordon, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1047-48.
79 Asis Internet Servs., 2006 WL 1820902 at * 13.
80 d. at *11.
" Id. at *13. The court dismissed the state claim without prejudice, however, because plaintiff
had not asserted that the offending commercial emails "advertised" as required by the
California law.
82 See generally Jeffrey D. Zentner, State Regulation of Unsolicited Bulk Commercial E-mail
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 477 (2006) (analyzing
Virginia's anti-spam statute).
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law claims require a plaintiff to prove the sender knew or should have
known the recipient of its message was in the relevant state with the
anti-spain statute. Proof of this intra-state "nexus" justifies regulation
by the particular state over the out-of-state business. These nexus
standards, however, trigger complaints that the state laws unduly
burden interstate businesses that are subjected to multi-state
regulation. 83  Email senders' actual knowledge about a recipient's
physical location in a particular regulating state is unlikely since the
email address does not provide the recipient's physical address.
In a seminal case decided before CAN-SPAM was enacted, the
Washington Supreme Court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to
the Washington Commercial Electronic Mail Act.8 4 The Washington
Act prohibits transmitting emails with false or misleading subject
lines, origins, or transmission paths to an email address that the sender
"knows, or has reason to know, is held by a Washington resident."85
The Act goes on to state that a "person knows that the intended
recipient ... is a Washington resident if that information is available,
upon request, from the registrant of the Internet domain name
contained in the recipient's electronic mail address."86  Identical or
similar "knowledge" approaches are used in the anti-spam statutes of
Arizona, 87 Florida,88 Indiana, 89 Kansas, 90 Michigan,91 Rhode Island, 92
West Virginia,93 and Wyoming.94 These state law provisions address
83 See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
'4 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411-12.
85 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.190.020(1) (2007).
81 § 19.190.020(2).
87 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1372.01(E)(2) (2006).
88 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 668.606(4) (West 2007).
89 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-22-7(A) (West 2006).
90 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,107(D) (2005).
91 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.2503 (2007).
92 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-47-2 (2001).
93 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6G-2 (West 2006).
94 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4 0-1 2-402(a)(2007). The Wyoming provision goes on to state that it
will be enforced if the sender knew or had reason to know the recipient was located in a state
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one of Congress's findings for the CAN-SPAM Act. Although email
senders do not know where a recipient is located merely by his or her
email address, these states have concluded that simply looking at the
email address to determine applicable state laws is inadequate. A
check of the ISPs records to know where the recipient is located is
expected and justifiable.
Naturally, checking with the ISP for a recipient's home address is
wholly inconsistent with spammers' modus operandi of snagging
active email addresses from cyberspace and using them for mass,
untargeted messages. 95 But, the whole point of anti-spain legislation is
to discourage, disrupt and penalize spammers for doing business as
usual. Accordingly, the burden of legal compliance in these states
seems completely justifiable in light of the purpose behind these
statutes (and CAN-SPAM as well). 96'
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court established
a two-part test to determine if a state law imposes an undue burden on
interstate commerce. 97 First, the state must assert a legitimate state
interest for its regulation. Then the state statutory burden on interstate
commerce is weighed against the local benefit derived from the state
law.98  In explaining the state's legitimate interest in regulating
unsolicited email, State y. Heckel detailed the commonly-cited harms
to ISPs and email users.
99
Regarding the second prong of the Pike test, the Heckel Court
concluded that the only burden placed on interstate commerce by the
or other jurisdiction with laws similar to Wyoming's. Id. State laws that regulate outside their
own territory have been deemed per se invalid. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336
(1989).
95 See, e.g., Matthew Barakat, Dissecting the MO. of a Convicted Spammer, INFO. WEEK, Nov.
14, 2005, http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=52601698.
96 Other states' mandates are triggered simply by virtue of the email being received by a state
resident or received on or through a computer or computer network in the state. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-88-603(a) (2007); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.1(b) (West 2007); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 6-2.5-105 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 52-59b(5); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 511/1 0(b) (West 2007); IOWA CODE § 714E. 1.5 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.64(A)(10) (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 776.3 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-328.1 (2007). Pennsylvania's act is only triggered when the offending message is sent
from a computer in the state. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2250.3(a) (West 2007).
97 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
98Id. at 143.
99 See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
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Washington anti-spam law was "the requirement of truthfulness, a
requirement that does not burden commerce at all but actually
facilitates it by eliminating fraud and deception."' 100 The Court further
noted that the truthfulness requirements of the Washington Act did not
conflict with the requirements of any other state law (nor of CAN-
SPAM now). In other words, Heckel makes it clear that it does not
matter whether the email advertiser expressly knows where its
messages are being received and what state law is in effect there. As
long as the sender knows its practices are not fraudulent, misleading,
or deceptive, it can be confident it is in compliance wherever its
messages are received.
In upholding the Maryland anti-spain law in Beyond Systems,
Inc.,10 1 the Maryland federal district court relied heavily on the Heckel
analysis. Additionally, the Court concluded that the express provision
in CAN-SPAM that preserves the states' power to regulate false and
misleading emails proves that Congress was satisfied that
"supplementary state legislation would impose no undue burden on
interstate commerce."10 2
Clearly, these recent cases confirm that states are still empowered
to regulate false and misleading email under state anti-spam statutes.
Private parties retain their rights to pursue all tort claims against
spammers. Further, ISPs have a private cause of action for violations
of state laws regardless of the truth or falsity of the spam.10 3  But
consumer and business recipients of truthful unwanted messages
remain without recourse against these costly forms of commercial
speech. This gap in anti-spam protection is discussed next.
'ooHeckel, 24 P.3d at 411 (citing Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L. J. 785, 819 (2001)). See also Jaynes v.
Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 357, 368 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding the Virginia Computer
Crimes Act under the Commerce Power).
101 BeyondSys., Inc., 422 F. Supp. at 533-35.
102 Id. at 535.
103 In these private claims under state law, plaintiffs still have to justify why the courts of that
state can assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. See sources cited supra
note 66 and accompanying text. Some of the same "knowledge" standards for liability under
the state anti-spam statutes will also address whether the defendant "purposely availed" itself
of the in-state market, justifying personal jurisdiction by the local courts. See e.g., IOWA CODE§ 714E. 1.4(5) (2007) (expressly stating that transmitting to or through a computer in the state
constitutes an act in the state for personal jurisdiction).
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V. THE GAPING HOLE IN ANTI-SPAM REGULATION: PROTECTION FOR
RECIPIENTS AGAINST UNWANTED, TRUTHFUL MESSAGES
What has preemption under CAN-SPAM actually accomplished?
As the cases above illustrate, claims to address the false and
misleading aspects of unwanted email are alive and well under both
federal and state law. Senders of these messages are called upon to
defend claims in numerous states subject only to the limits of the
courts' ability to get personal jurisdiction over them. 104
Nothing in CAN-SPAM, however, seems to address the deluge of
truthful but unwanted commercial messages. So-called "law-abiding
businesses" can send truthful mass emails with the necessary federal
disclosures and opt-out notices. If these allegedly law-abiding
businesses fail to honor those opt-out messages, however, they will
only be subject to claims when a critical mass of complaints from
recipients reaches the FTC, state attorneys general, or ISPs. Recipients
still have no meaningful legal recourse to address the deluge of
unwanted messages, such as credit card and mortgage offers, in the
same inbox as messages from family and friends.
If supplementary state regulation of false and misleading spain
does not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce, then how
does state-by-state compliance unduly burden the senders of truthful
but unwanted emails? The burden of state-by-state compliance does
not change with the truthfulness or falsity of the messages. According
to Heckel, different compliance requirements from state to state do not
render state statutes an undue burden on interstate commerce if the
cost of complying with those different mandates does not clearly
outweigh the local benefits from the laws.
10 5
Congress expressly preempted state anti-spam constraints on
truthful messaging "because, since an electronic mail address does not
specify a geographic location, it can be extremely difficult for law-
104 See sources cited supra note 66 and accompanying text.
105 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 412. Presumably, this analysis would have applied to state mandates for
emails to include specific subject headings such as ADV or ADV ADULT, but for express
preemption of those mandates under CAN-SPAM. As was noted above, a majority of states
with anti-spain laws had adopted this particular subject line mandate. The remaining states'
anti-spam laws did not adopt a varying mix of different subject line mandates, but rather none
at all. In light of the significant costs associated with spam, the addition of ADV or ADV
ADULT to an email subject line pursuant to state law would be easily defensible under the
Pike test. State-by-state compliance with this fairly uniform standard would have been simple,
cost-effective, and could have greatly improved spam filtering with little burden on interstate
commerce.
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abiding businesses to know with which of these disparate statutes they
are required to comply.' ' 0 6  While Congress simply accepted the
obvious fact that email addresses do not include geographic locations,
many states found that simple inquiries would permit so-called law-
abiding businesses to know the recipient's geographic location. A
check of the ISP's records to find out the recipient's location is
expected or at least justifiable in the face of the unacceptable burdens
spain imposes on email communications.
Again, the current business model used by spammers does not
conceive of checking with an ISP for a recipient's home address and
then determining if the advertising program meets the recipient's home
state laws. However, regulations should alter the spammers' current
model of blanketing any and all active email addresses with untargeted
messages.
For businesses that engage in deceptive email tactics, it does not
matter whether they know the specific states they are peppering with
their mass-email transmissions. It is likely that their massive
transmissions are landing in every state and they are likely to be liable
for these tactics in every state with an anti-spam law. CAN-SPAM
expressly permits this state enforcement. Why shouldn't the same
regulatory burden apply to senders of mass messages that are truthful?
Senders of truthful spam impose the same burdens on email systems
and users. They too shift the costs of their advertising onto the
recipient. Their messages still require that systems and users invest in
filtering processes that risk the loss of wanted, non-spam messages. In
other words, these truthful messages pose the same threats to the
convenience and efficiency of this important and popular
communications vehicle. But, the senders of these truthful mass
messages face none of the state regulatory constraints that plaintiffs
are utilizing against the senders of deceptive messages. These senders
of truthful messages should be imputed with the same constructive
knowledge as their deceptive counterparts that their mass messages are
received in every state and, thus, are actionable under every state law.
Congress expressed concern about the burden on legitimate
commerce from state regulation of unwanted, truthful spam. The real
concern, however, should be about the burdens that all untargeted
email messages impose on Internet users, themselves participants in
interstate commerce. Federal legislation needs to completely upend
the practice of spamming by imposing significant burdens that make
unwanted commercial email an unprofitable marketing method.
106 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1 1) (2000).
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Congress should reinstate all the private rights of action under state
laws that were preempted by CAN-SPAM. Individual recipients could
then pursue statutory damages from any sender of spam who ignores
opt-out messages, not just senders whose messages violate the
deception prohibitions. Alternatively, Congress should create a
meaningful private cause of action for recipients in a revised CAN-
SPAM Act. This article concludes with a discussion of this
recommendation.
VI. A NEW CLAIM FOR RECIPIENTS AGAINST
UNWANTED COMMERCIAL EMAIL
The intrusiveness of unwanted direct telephone advertising has
been successfully addressed by state and federal legislation that
provides telephone customers with a variety of options, including
registration on the state or federal do-not-call lists.'0 7 Many states' do-
not-call and do-not-fax laws include a private cause of action, 10 asdoes the original federal telemarketing law, the Telephone Consumer
107 The FTC's do-not-call list only protects consumers and does not apply to unsolicited fax
advertising. The FCC regulates both telemarketing and fax advertising under the TCPA,
which is not limited to consumers and provides a private cause of action for recipients of
prohibited advertising. See generally FCC, Fax Advertising: What You Need to Know,
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/unwantedfaxes.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008). Upon
enacting CAN-SPAM, Congress ordered the FTC to consider a government-enforced do-not-
email list, akin to the highly popular federal and state do-not-call lists for unwanted
telemarketing. In June 2004, after a brief investigation, the FTC decided not to establish a
national do-not-email registry. The Commission concluded that existence of such a list could
do more harm than good in preventing unwanted email solicitation because it would yield a
trove of viable email addresses for spammers to access. See FTC, NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL
REGISTRY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
dneregistry/report.pdf. One commentator, however, notes that the existence of such a registry
would allow registrants to associate their email address with a physical location, thereby
giving notice to the sender of the state's law that applies to communications with that address
and the state courts that would be taking jurisdiction over a violation of those statutes. See
Hamel, supra note 40, at 987.
108 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1482 (2006); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.43(b)(2)
(West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1747(B) (2003); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 445.1776
(West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.395(3) (2004); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-aa(2)
(McKinney 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-23 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-75-50(B)
(2005); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.47(f) (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-25a-
107 (2005). Some states characterize violations of their do-not-call or do-not-fax laws as
deceptive or unfair trade practices and provide private causes of action under their general
trade statutes. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §6-1-906 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. §48-1003
(2003); 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2250.7 (West 2007).
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Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA").' 0 9 The only constraint on consumer
protection with respect to truthful advertising messages has come from
the commercial speech doctrine. Telemarketers' claims of free speech
rights have been tried and rejected as a constraint on the telemarketing
regulatory mechanisms.110 CAN-SPAM has also survived early
commercial speech challenges.''
Congress should reinstate all of the private rights of action under
state law that were preempted by CAN-SPAM or should create a
private cause of action for spam recipients akin to what was created in
the TCPA.112 All recipients of any and all unwanted commercial email
should be armed with significant remedies in individual or class action
claims when opt-out requests are ignored (or worse, used to target the
email address that was used to opt-out with even more spam).
Consumers should be educated on how to preserve and pursue their
claims.
Under the TCPA, a person who has received more than one
telephone call within any 12-month period from the same entity after
that person has "opted-out" may sue in state court and receive up to$500 in damages for each violation. A similar private cause of action
for unwanted email could be easy for individuals and businesses to
pursue and win because the paper trail is readily accessible (unlike a
109 A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or
on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection
may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State bring in an appropriate
court of that State:
(A) an action based on a violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection to
enjoin such violation,
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive up
to $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or
(C) both such actions.
47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (2000).
110 See, e.g., Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 812 (2004) (upholding the constitutionality of the national do-not-call list); see also
Missouri ex rel. v. American Blast Fax, Inc. 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1104 (2004) and Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (both
upholding the constitutionality of the TCPA, specifically its prohibitions on unsolicited fax
advertising).
I'j White Buffalo Ventures, LLC, 420 F.3d at 374-78.
112 See sources cited supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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phone log that consumers had to maintain to prove a claim under the
TCPA).
Currently, recipients of unwanted email are often told not to use
the opt-out mechanisms because these replies simply confirm to the
spanmer that they have found a valid, in-use email address to continue
to target and to sell to other spammers 11 3 This common advice shows
just how ineffective the CAN-SPAM protection and remedies are if
consumers are actually advised not to exercise the rights the statute
provides. Arguably, if opt-out replies actually became the basis for
meaningful remedies, spanmers might not be so cavalier in their
decisions to flaunt them. If recipients invoked meaningful opt-out
remedies in the same numbers that they signed up for state and federal
do-not-call lists, spammers might finally feel some meaningful
deterrence.
Recipients could be advised to include in their opt-out requests a
statement about their intention to invoke this private right of action in
their specific home state. This informs the spammer of the physical
residence where the spam has been received and where the opt-out
protection is being invoked. Then if the opt-out message is ignored by
the spammer, this notice and exchange of messages between the
spammer and the recipient should be sufficient to justify personal
jurisdiction over the spammer in the recipient's state courts, as well as
prove the state or CAN-SPAM statutory violation. 
114
Presumably, these actions would likely only be asserted against the
most egregious spammers that refuse to honor consumer opt-out
requests. Congress could copy the affirmative defense it adopted
under the TCPA for organizations that show they had meaningful
systems in place for complying with opt-out requests."' In fact, many
of the state anti-spain private causes of action provided affirmative
defenses for businesses that mistakenly send offending emails if they
had a system in place to prevent such violations.1 1 6  These defenses
113 See Maggs, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
114 See sources cited supra note 66 and accompanying text.
115 "It shall be an affirmative defense in any action brought under this paragraph that the
defendant has established and implemented, with due care, reasonable practices and
procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of the regulations
prescribed under this subsection." 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (2000).
116 It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this subchapter if a person can demonstrate that
the sender at the time of the alleged violation had:
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suggest that when states enacted anti-spam laws, they looked to the
TCPA as a template for a system of remedies Congress would find
appropriate. Nevertheless, the states found those remedies preempted
by a federal system that provided nothing comparable for non-ISP
recipients of truthful, unwanted email. Congress should rectify that
approach now.
Some commentators might argue that the company-specific do-
not-call mandate under the TCPA had a poor record for consumer
satisfaction. 117  That dissatisfaction led states, and eventually the
federal government, to adopt government-enforced do-not-call lists.
The major drawback to the private cause of action under the TCPA
is its lack of an attorney's fees provision. This makes pursuing claims
under the statute problematic for consumers. When a consumer wins a
small claims judgment under the $500 per message statutory provision,
there is no disincentive for the defendant to initiate a trial de novo in
federal district court. At that point, defendants can inundate pro se
plaintiffs with intimidating motions and the threat of a jury trial.
Most state anti-spam laws provide attorney's fees with their private
causes of action. 119  Extending the CAN-SPAM attorney's fees
provision to a new private claim for individual recipients would
motivate counsel to represent these plaintiffs and would deter specious
legal defenses.
(1) Maintained a list of consumers who have notified the person not to send any
subsequent commercial electronic messages;
(2) Established and implemented with due care and reasonable practices and procedures
to effectively prevent unsolicited commercial electronic mail messages in violation
of this subchapter;
(3) Trained the sender's personnel in the requirements of this subchapter; and(4) Maintained records demonstrating compliance with this subchapter.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-606(c) (2007). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-22-10(c) (2006);
KA. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,107(k) (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325M.07 (2004).
117 FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, Final Amended Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4629 (2003) (to
be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
118 See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center and Private Citizen, Inc. at 3-4, as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, Carnett's Inc. v. Hammond, 596 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. App.
2004) (No. S04G1 241), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
telemarketing/hammond.pdf.
"
9 See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Relating to
Unsolicited Commercial or Bulk Email (SPAM), updated Jan. 24, 2006,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/legislation/spamlaws02.htm.
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The TCPA private cause of action has been successfully invoked to
tackle the problem of unsolicited text message advertisements to
mobile communications devices.12 0  This suggests that the TCPA
model is a useful one for protecting modem communications. The
TCPA, however, has been held to not apply to spam.121
Further, lawyers have used class action litigation under the TCPA
to make its private cause of action more feasible. 122  While class
actions have been criticized for rewarding attorneys more than
victims, 123 they provide strong incentives for lawyers to pursue private
consumer protection claims that could create meaningful deterrents to
spammers who violate CAN-SPAM and the state law provisions. 124
For this reason, a class action provision should also be expressly
established in any new anti-spam claim for recipients. Again, if anti-
spam legislation included meaningful remedies, spammers might
finally be deterred in their flagrant violations of federal and state law.
120 See, e.g., Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.3d 831, 835 (Ariz. App. 2005).
121 Aronson v. Bright-Teeth Now, L.L.C., 824 A.2d 320, 323 (Pa Super. Ct. 2003). Plaintiff
sued Bright-Teeth under the TCPA in state court after receiving six unsolicited emails. The
TCPA prohibits "using a telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an
unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." Id. at 321 (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(C)). Aronson claimed that his personal computer fell within the definition of a
"telephone facsimile machine." The Court held that the TCPA does not apply to span. See
also Bobby Kerlik, Man Awarded $89,100 in Fight to Can Span, TuB.-REv. (Pittsburg, Pa.),
Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/cityregion/
s_474476.html (discussing Aronson's use of the Pennsylvania anti-spam law to tackle
unwanted email).
122 Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Personal Comm'ns, L.P., 329 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 802-3 (M.D. La. 2004). See also Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 537
S.E.2d 468, 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
123 See generally Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Plagued by Concerns Over
Federalism, Jurisdiction and Fairness, 37 AKRON L. REV. 589 (2004); see also Susan D.
Susman, Class Actions. Consumer Sword Turned Corporate Shield?, 2003 U. CHu. LEGAL F. 1
(2003).
124 See Sherman, supra note 123, at 592; see also Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's
Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage
Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 299-300 (1980) (small claimant class actions promote
deterrence, but not compensation); David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule
23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19 (2003) (arguing that
class actions in mass tort cases provide important economies of scale and ensure the best
possible deterrence of defendants, but opt-outs reduce the effectiveness of the class action as a
deterrent).
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VII. CONCLUSION
When CAN-SPAM was originally passed, it was widely criticized
for its anemic consumer protection. 12 So far, most enforcement under
the law is targeted at false and deceptive messages. 126 The federal law
has little or no effect on truthful unwanted messaging that email users
find so frustrating and time-consuming. It is time for Congress to
improve on this initial legislation.
In its findings supporting CAN-SPAM, Congress found that
technological and legislative tools (including international responses)
were necessary to fight spam. Many argue that the only real way to
tackle spam is through technological solutions. 127 Similar arguments
were made about blocking telemarketing calls with technology. 28 But
states' do-not-call laws empowered individual consumers against that
unwanted commercial speech. In other realms like product safety and
personal security, society uses technology to prevent harms, but still
permits individuals to sue those who commit harms regardless of
technological advances. The advent of seatbelts, airbags and burglar
alarms did not eliminate private claims for damages against bad
drivers and thieves.
125 See Zhang supra note 35, at 319-20; see also John W. Daniel, Has Spam Been Fried? Why
the CAN-SPAMAct of 2003 Can't: Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail and
the CAN-SPAMAct of 2003, 94 Ky. L.J. 363 (2005/2006); Thomas K. Ledbetter, Stopping
Unsolicited Commercial E-mail: Why the CAN-SPAMAct is Not the Solution to Stop Spain,
34 Sw. U. L. REv. 107 (2004).
126 Twelve of the twenty FTC actions to enforce CAN-SPAM included claims of false or
misleading transmission information under 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1) or deceptive subject lines
under 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2). FTC, supra note 50.
127 "No single law or method is going to stop spam. Because of the intangible and boundary-
less nature of the Internet a technical solution and international solution is necessary." Grant
A. Yang, CAN-SPAM: A First Step to No-Spam, 4 CHi.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2004),
available at http://jip.kentlaw.edu/archives.asp?vol=4&iss=l. "The inexorable rise in the
volume of unsolicited commercial electronic messages and the inherent limitations of
regulatory regimes make a technical solution to combating spam imperative." Taiwo Oriola,
Regulating Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail in the United States and the European
Union: Challenges and Prospects, 7 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 113, 164 (2005).
128 "[M]any new technologies provide alternatives to a complete ban, indicating that Congress
has not chosen a solution that fairly balances consumers' interest in privacy with ADAD
users' rights to free speech." Howard E. Berkenblit, Can Those Telemarketing Machines Keep
Calling Me?-The Telephone Consumer Protection Act after Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REv.
85, 109 (1994). See also, Note, The Impermeable Life: Unsolicited Communications in the
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Nothing about spam suggests that it is such a uniquely vexing
technological problem that statutory remedies crafted by the states
need to be preempted, especially when Congress provides nothing
comparable in CAN-SPAM. Congress never explained why the
private litigation tool that was established by most state statutes was
preempted for spain recipients. Congress allowed individual tort
claims to remain in effect, but, for no obvious reason, wiped out the
individual claims for statutory damages.
The traditional self-help role of individual litigation should be
resurrected to tackle this modem communications problem.
Businesses and individuals, when armed with meaningful legal rights,
can have a real impact on stemming the tide of unwanted commercial
email.
